ADVISORY: Return Of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Threat

The Bleichenbacher attack is back

Now named “Return Of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Threat” (ROBOT) this 19-year-old vulnerability can allow an attacker to decrypt HTTPS traffic by exploiting some RSA encryption implementations.

ROBOT is a variation of the old Bleichenbacher attack from 1998 which is a padding oracle attack on RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption for key exchange.

Hosts that are supporting RSA encryption with one of the vulnerable TLS/SSL implementations can be impacted.

Details of the Return Of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Threat

The Bleichenbacher attack is applicable to the TLS-RSA key exchange. This key exchange is used in all cipher suites having names starting with TLS_RSA (e.g. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256).

An attacker can make use of specially crafted TLS client handshakes (different RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 paddings, valid or not) with the TLS server acting as an oracle (based on the response status) to decrypt arbitrary ciphertext without access to the private key (i.e. adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack).

The novelty of the ROBOT attack, compared to the original Bleichenbacher’s one, is that TLS implementations known to be vulnerable may return different TLS alerts and/or connection closures depending on the crafted padding, and this side-channel information can be used to improve the efficiency of the attack (less requests needed).

Are DenyAll products vulnerable to this Return Of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Threat?

The DenyAll products are *not* vulnerable to this attack.

The OpenSSL’s implementation of TLS used in DenyAll products always completes invalid handshakes before returning the (same) appropriate TLS-alert, and so according to the TLS 1.0 (and later) specification’s recommendation against this old and well known attack. In this regard, the new attack doesn’t exploit a new TLS vulnerabilty, servers immune to the old Bleichenbacher attack remain immune to this new attack, while vulnerable servers may now face a faster attack.

About the DARC

The DenyAll Research Center (DARC) is an internal division of DenyAll, which focuses on threat analysis and mitigation. Over the last 15 years, this department’s research has contributed to the design of state-of-the art Web application security solutions.


Xavier Quoniam, Marketing Manager on Linkedin
Xavier Quoniam, Marketing Manager
Xavier is our Marketing Manager. He is passionate about disruptive technologies that transform how companies communicate. He brings us its passion, curiosity, and fresh ideas to promote DenyAll and Cloud Protector at its best.

By continuing to browse on our website, you agree to the use of Cookies for: (i) the operation and interactivity of our website, (ii) measuring the audience of our website and analyse your browsing. More information

The cookie settings on this website are set to "allow cookies" to give you the best browsing experience possible. If you continue to use this website without changing your cookie settings or you click "Accept" below then you are consenting to this.